Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56808
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dc.contributor.authorSuzuki, Toruen_US
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:26:34Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:26:34Z-
dc.date.issued2010en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56808-
dc.description.abstractAgents compete to acquire a limited economic opportunity of uncertain profitability. Each agent decides how much he acquires public signals before making investment under fear of preemption. I show that equilibria have various levels of efficiency under mild competition. The effect of competition on the equilibrium strategy is different depending on which class of equilibrium we focus on. However, when competitive pressure is sufficiently high, there exists a unique equilibrium. Finally, I show that the effect of competition on efficiency is different between the common value and the private value setting. Strong competition leads to the least efficient equilibrium for the common value setting but efficiency can be improved by competition in the private value setting.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. [u.a.] |cJenaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena economic research papers |x2010,085en_US
dc.subject.jelC73en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordcompetitionen_US
dc.subject.keywordpreemption gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordstrategic real optionen_US
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben_US
dc.subject.stwBeschaffungen_US
dc.subject.stwRealoptionen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleNegative and positive effects of competition in a preemption gameen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn641292368en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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