Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56659
Authors: 
Mechtenberg, Lydia
Münster, Johannes
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
SFB 649 discussion paper 2011-012
Abstract: 
This note reconsiders communication between an informed expert and an uninformed decision maker with a strategic mediator in a discrete Crawford and Sobel (1982) setting. We show that a strategic mediator may improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert. The mediator improves communication, however, only if some information transmission is possible with unmediated communication.
Subjects: 
communication
information
cheap talk
mediation
JEL: 
C72
D82
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
247.43 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.