Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56634 
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dc.contributor.authorFiocco, Raffaeleen
dc.contributor.authorScarpa, Carloen
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-29-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-05T16:12:27Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-05T16:12:27Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56634-
dc.description.abstractWe examine the issue of whether two monopolists which produce substitutable goods should be regulated by one (centralization) or two (decentralization) regulatory authorities, when the regulator(s) can be partially captured by industry. Under full information, two decentralized agencies - each regulating a single market - charge lower prices than a unique regulator, making consumers better off. However, this leads to excessive costs for the taxpayers who subsidize the firms, so that centralized regulation is preferable. Under asymmetric information about the firms' costs, lobbying induces a unique regulator to be more concerned with the industry's interests, and this decreases social welfare. When the substitutability between the goods is high enough, the firms' lobbying activity may be so strong that decentralizing the regulatory structure may be social welfare enhancing.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2011-046en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelL51en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordregulationen
dc.subject.keywordlobbyingen
dc.subject.keywordasymmetric informationen
dc.subject.keywordenergy marketsen
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen
dc.subject.stwZentralstaaten
dc.subject.stwDezentralisierungen
dc.subject.stwEnergiemarkten
dc.subject.stwProduktsubstitutionen
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe regulation of interdependent markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn667237372en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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