Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56582
Authors: 
Hefeker, Carsten
Zimmer, Blandine
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Joint discussion paper series in economics 01-2010
Abstract: 
This paper revisits the trade-of between central bank independence and conservatism using a New Keynesian model with uncertainty about the central banker's output gap target. It is shown that when this uncertainty is high, the trade-of no longer holds. In this case, the optimal combination between independence and conservatism is characterised by complementarity.
Subjects: 
central bank independence
conservatism
transparency of monetary policy
JEL: 
E52
E58
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
223.51 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.