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dc.contributor.authorGrigoryan, Arturen
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-04T13:56:03Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-04T13:56:03Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56570-
dc.description.abstractThe paper models the incentives of a politician to delegate the decision making power in a sovereign wealth fund to an independent external manager. It formalizes the learning-effects as well as the increase of transparency of the SWF and the rise of investment possibilities associated with higher transparency. It also focuses on the role of elections as a basic mechanism to control and discipline politicians. I show that the politician has incentives for strategic behaviour if voters have incomplete information about his competence. The paper also studies when the delegation of decision making power is socially optimal and under which circumstances it takes place.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aPhilipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics |cMarburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aMAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics |x17-2011en
dc.subject.jelD7en
dc.subject.jelE6en
dc.subject.jelF3en
dc.subject.jelG2en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSovereign Wealth Fund (SWF)en
dc.subject.keywordtransparencyen
dc.subject.keywordpolicy delegationen
dc.subject.keywordexternal managementen
dc.subject.stwStaatsfondsen
dc.subject.stwKooperative Führungen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwÖkonomischer Anreizen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleIncentives and the delegation of decision making power in sovereign wealth funds-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn657380016en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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