Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56563
Authors: 
Bühren, Christoph
Pleßner, Marco
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Joint discussion paper series in economics 25-2011
Abstract: 
By extending a typical endowment effect experiment with the possibility to win the endow-ment in a real effort contest, we found two enforcing effects that led to a complete market failure. Subjects who won the item in the competition had an extremely high willingness to accept (trophy effect). By contrast, subjects who were not successful had an extremely low willingness to pay for the same item (reverse trophy effect). We disentangle the different components of the trophy effect, compare it to similar experiments, and discuss its important economic implications.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
139.36 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.