Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56490 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorBejger, Sylwesteren
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-29-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-03T10:40:35Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-03T10:40:35Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56490-
dc.description.abstractThis article is devoted to the problem of the detection of overt or tacit collusion equilibrium in the context of the choice of the appropriate econometric method, a choice that is determined by the amount of information that the observer possesses. The author addresses this problem in two steps. First, to provide a theoretical background, he uses a collusion marker based on structural disturbances in a price process'; variance. Then, he applies a Markov switching model with switching in variance regimes. The author considers this method adequate and coherent with the problem structure and the research objective, and useful for assessing the functionality of the collusion marker he uses. He uses the model to examine the Indian cement industry in the period 1994-2009 and finds some objective indications of collusion and competition phases. These phases are confirmed by certain historical facts as well as by numerous research articles.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Discussion Papers |x2012-18en
dc.subject.jelC22en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelL61en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordExplicit and tacit collusionen
dc.subject.keywordcollusive equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordcartel detectionen
dc.subject.keywordcement industryen
dc.subject.keywordprice varianceen
dc.subject.keywordMarkov switching modelen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen
dc.subject.stwÖkonometrieen
dc.subject.stwMarkovscher Prozessen
dc.subject.stwZementindustrieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwIndienen
dc.titleCartel in the Indian cement industry: An attempt to identify it-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn689499442en
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.enen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201218en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
290.03 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.