Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56490
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dc.contributor.authorBejger, Sylwesteren_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-03T10:40:35Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-03T10:40:35Z-
dc.date.issued2012en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56490-
dc.description.abstractThis article is devoted to the problem of the detection of overt or tacit collusion equilibrium in the context of the choice of the appropriate econometric method, a choice that is determined by the amount of information that the observer possesses. The author addresses this problem in two steps. First, to provide a theoretical background, he uses a collusion marker based on structural disturbances in a price process'; variance. Then, he applies a Markov switching model with switching in variance regimes. The author considers this method adequate and coherent with the problem structure and the research objective, and useful for assessing the functionality of the collusion marker he uses. He uses the model to examine the Indian cement industry in the period 1994-2009 and finds some objective indications of collusion and competition phases. These phases are confirmed by certain historical facts as well as by numerous research articles.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Discussion Papers |x2012-18en_US
dc.subject.jelC22en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL61en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordExplicit and tacit collusionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcollusive equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordcartel detectionen_US
dc.subject.keywordcement industryen_US
dc.subject.keywordprice varianceen_US
dc.subject.keywordMarkov switching modelen_US
dc.subject.stwWettbewerbsbeschränkungen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonometrieen_US
dc.subject.stwMarkovscher Prozessen_US
dc.subject.stwZementindustrieen_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.subject.stwIndienen_US
dc.titleCartel in the Indian cement industry: An attempt to identify iten_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn689499442en_US
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.enen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201218-

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