Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56341
Authors: 
Burnham, Terence C.
Cesarini, David
Wallace, Björn
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 684
Abstract: 
Beauty contests are well-studied, dominance-solvable games that generate two interesting results. First, most behavior does not conform to the unique Nash equilibrium. Second, there is considerable unexplained heterogeneity in behavior. In this work, we evaluate the relationship between beauty contest behavior and cognitive ability. We find that subjects with high cognitive ability exhibit behavior that is closer to the Nash equlibrium. We examine this finding through the prism of economic and biological theory.
Subjects: 
beauty contest
rationality
cognitive ability
Nash equlibrium
JEL: 
C90
D01
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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