Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56267
Authors: 
Viossat, Yannick
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 629
Abstract: 
In (Viossat, 2006, The replicator dynamics does not lead to correlated equilibria, forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior), it was shown that the replicator dynamics may eliminate all pure strategies used in correlated equilibrium, so that only strategies that do not take part in any correlated equilibrium remain. Here, we generalize this result by showing that it holds for an open set of games, and for many other dynamics, including the best-response dynamics, the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics and any monotonic or weakly sign-preserving dynamics satisfying some standard regularity conditions. For the replicator dynamics and the best-response dynamics, elimination of all strategies used in correlated equilibrium is shown to be robust to the addition of mixed strategies as new pure strategies.
Subjects: 
Correlated equilibrium
evolutionary dynamics
survival
as-if rationality
JEL: 
C72
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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