Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56259
Authors: 
Voorneveld, Mark
Kets, Willemien
Norde, Henk
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 589
Abstract: 
Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article.
Subjects: 
Minimal curb sets
Consistency
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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