Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56220
Authors: 
Voorneveld, Mark
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 485
Abstract: 
A product set of pure strategies is a prep set (prep is short for preparation) if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying minor topological conditions. The concept of minimal prep sets is compared with (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria, minimal curb sets, and rationalizability. Additional dynamic motivation for the concept is provided by a model of adaptive play that is shown to settle down in minimal prep sets.
Subjects: 
noncooperative games
inertia
status quo bias
adaptive play
procedural rationality
JEL: 
C72
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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