Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56160 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2002
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 486
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
Publicly provided health care implies considerable intergenerational redistribution. The possibility of accumulating a fund or debt will affect the degree of redistribution as well as how efficient the financing of health care is. In a voting model we study how governments inability to make binding long-term policy commitments will affect the accumulation of a fund or debt. Today's government will base its policy decisions on expectations about future governments behavior and simply follow suit, which results in strong political inertia. Either a fund or debt may therefore be upheld in political equilibrium. But no mechanism ensure that it is at its optimal level. If there is fund in steady state, the more political clout the old have the smaller will the fund be, i.e saving decrease. If there is debt, however, a politically stronger old generation may imply a smaller debt, i.e. savings increase.
Schlagwörter: 
Voting
health expenditure
intergenerational transfers
dynamic politics
JEL: 
D78
H55
I10
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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