Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56149
Authors: 
Glazer, Amihai
Segendorff, Björn
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 458
Abstract: 
We consider a leader and a subordinate he appoints who engage in team production. The public observes the organization's performance, but is unable to determine the separate contributions of the leader and of the subordinate. The leader may therefore claim credit for the good work of his subordinate. We find conditions which induce the leader to claim credit (both truthfully and untruthfully), and the conditions which lead the leader to appoint a subordinate of low ability.
Subjects: 
Leader
Credit claiming
asymmetric information
Equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
J33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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