Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56146
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBuccirossi, Paoloen_US
dc.contributor.authorSpagnolo, Giancarloen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:04:36Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:04:36Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56146-
dc.description.abstractWe study the consequences of 'leniency' - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on corruption, drug dealing, and other forms of sequential, bilateral, illegal trade. We find that when not properly designed, leniency may be highly counterproductive. In reality leniency is typically moderate, in the sense of only reducing, or at best cancelling the sanctions for the self-reporting party. Moderate leniency may greatly facilitate the enforcement of long-term illegal trade relations, and may even provide an effective enforcement mechanism for occasional (one-shot) illegal transactions, which would not be enforceable otherwise.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aEkonomiska Forskningsinst. |cStockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x456en_US
dc.subject.jelK00en_US
dc.subject.jelK21en_US
dc.subject.jelK42en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordLaw enforcementen_US
dc.subject.keywordSelf-reportingen_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordCrimeen_US
dc.subject.keywordIllegal tradeen_US
dc.subject.keywordDrug dealingen_US
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen_US
dc.subject.stwStrafverfahrenen_US
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftskriminalitäten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleThe effects of leniency on illegal transactions: How (not) to fight corruptionen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn333197151en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

Files in This Item:
File
Size
479.97 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.