Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56146 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 456
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the consequences of 'leniency' - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on corruption, drug dealing, and other forms of sequential, bilateral, illegal trade. We find that when not properly designed, leniency may be highly counterproductive. In reality leniency is typically moderate, in the sense of only reducing, or at best cancelling the sanctions for the self-reporting party. Moderate leniency may greatly facilitate the enforcement of long-term illegal trade relations, and may even provide an effective enforcement mechanism for occasional (one-shot) illegal transactions, which would not be enforceable otherwise.
Schlagwörter: 
Law enforcement
Self-reporting
Corruption
Crime
Illegal trade
Drug dealing
JEL: 
K00
K21
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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