Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56139
Authors: 
Glazer, Amihai
Segendorff, Björn
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 424
Abstract: 
A leader of an organization may view a subordinate as threatening or weakening the leader's position. The threat may increase with the subordinate's ability and reduce the rents the leader wins. In particular, a leader who trains his subordinate reduces the cost to the owner of a firm in replacing the leader, and so reduces the leader's bargaining power. The leader therefore provides inefficiently low training for the subordinate.
Subjects: 
Leader
Subordinate
Threat
Training
Bargaining
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
J33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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