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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56126
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Voorneveld, Mark | en |
dc.contributor.author | Lundström, Helena Fagraeus | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-28T13:04:02Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-03-28T13:04:02Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2005 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56126 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In a large family of solution concepts for boundedly rational players - allowing players to be imperfect optimizers, but requiring that better responses are chosen with probabilities at least as high as those of worse responses - most of Thompson's inessential transformations for the strategic equivalence of extensive form games become far from inconsequential. Only two of the usual elementary transformations remain truly inessential: the interchange of moves, and replacing a final move by nature by simply taking expected payoffs. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholm | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x605 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C72 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Extensive form games | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Quantal response equilibrium | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Logit model | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Strategic equivalence | en |
dc.subject.stw | Beschränkte Rationalität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.subject.stw | Logit-Modell | en |
dc.title | Strategie equivalence and bounded rationality in extensive form games | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 501540938 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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