Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56115
Authors: 
Glazer, Amihai
Segendorff, Björn
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 425
Abstract: 
Consider team production with two people. Each is characterized by a prior distribution that he will do Right or Wrong. After the outcome of the project is observed, these probabilities are updated. When output depends on the weakest link in production, following project failure the posterior probability that a person did Right declines with the probability that the other worker did Right. The same holds when output depends on the best shot in production and the team effort succeeded. A leader concerned about his reputation may therefore prefer to work with a person unlikely to do Right.
Subjects: 
Reputation
team
competence
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
J33
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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