Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56104
Authors: 
Asheim, Geir
Voorneveld, Mark
Weibull, Jörgen W.
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 714
Abstract: 
This paper provides two conditions of epistemic robustness, robustness to alternative best replies and robustness to non-best replies, and uses them to characterize variants of curb sets in finite games, including the set of rationalizable strategies.
Subjects: 
epistemic game theory
epistemic robustness
rationalizability
closedness under rational behavior
mutual p-belief
JEL: 
C72
D83
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
191.76 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.