Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56100
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dc.contributor.authorTernström, Ingelaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:03:22Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:03:22Z-
dc.date.issued2001en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56100-
dc.description.abstractMany of the world's common pool resources are located in poor countries, where consumption levels may be low enough to adversely affect the users' health. Under these circumstances, an agent's utility function may be described as an S-shaped function of consumption. Using non-cooperative game theory, very poor groups of users are shown to have lower probability of cooperative management of common pool resources than groups with adequate consumption levels. However, users that are only moderately poor have the greatest chance for cooperation. For this group, if resource productivity varies, cooperation may break down in periods of low productivity. The theoretical results concur with empirical evidence of cooperation in common pool resources.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aEkonomiska Forskningsinst. |cStockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x428en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelO13en_US
dc.subject.jelQ15en_US
dc.subject.jelQ25en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCommon pool resourceen_US
dc.subject.keyworddeveloping countriesen_US
dc.subject.keyworddynamic gameen_US
dc.subject.keywordirrigationen_US
dc.subject.keywordnatural resourceen_US
dc.subject.keywordnon-linear utilityen_US
dc.titleCooperation or conflict in common poolsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn687672376en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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