Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56100 
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dc.contributor.authorTernström, Ingelaen
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-29-
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:03:22Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:03:22Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56100-
dc.description.abstractMany of the world's common pool resources are located in poor countries, where consumption levels may be low enough to adversely affect the users' health. Under these circumstances, an agent's utility function may be described as an S-shaped function of consumption. Using non-cooperative game theory, very poor groups of users are shown to have lower probability of cooperative management of common pool resources than groups with adequate consumption levels. However, users that are only moderately poor have the greatest chance for cooperation. For this group, if resource productivity varies, cooperation may break down in periods of low productivity. The theoretical results concur with empirical evidence of cooperation in common pool resources.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x428en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelO13en
dc.subject.jelQ15en
dc.subject.jelQ25en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCommon pool resourceen
dc.subject.keyworddeveloping countriesen
dc.subject.keyworddynamic gameen
dc.subject.keywordirrigationen
dc.subject.keywordnatural resourceen
dc.subject.keywordnon-linear utilityen
dc.titleCooperation or conflict in common pools-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn687672376en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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