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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56087
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Bernergård, Axel | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-02-14 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-28T13:02:50Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-03-28T13:02:50Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2011 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56087 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The folk theorems for infinitely repeated games with discounting presume that the discount rate between two successive periods is constant. Following the literature on quasi-exponential or hyperbolic discounting, I model the repeated interaction between two or more decision makers in a way that allows present-biased discounting where the discount factor between two successive periods increases with the waiting time until the periods are reached. I generalize Fudenberg and Maskin's (1986) and Abreu, Dutta and Smith's (1994) folk theorems for repeated games with discounting so that they apply when discounting is present-biased. Patience is then represented either by the discount factor between the next and the current period or, alternatively, by the sum of the discount factors for all future periods. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholm | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x736 | en |
dc.subject.jel | C73 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | folk theorem | en |
dc.subject.keyword | present-biased | en |
dc.subject.keyword | discounting | en |
dc.subject.keyword | hyperbolic | en |
dc.subject.stw | Wiederholte Spiele | en |
dc.subject.stw | Zeitkonsistenz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Folk-Theorem | en |
dc.subject.stw | Spieltheorie | en |
dc.title | Folk theorems for present-biased players | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 663470307 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
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