Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56077
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dc.contributor.authorLe Coq, Chloéen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:02:22Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:02:22Z-
dc.date.issued2004en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56077-
dc.description.abstractIt has been argued that having a contract market before the spot market enhances competition (Allaz and Vila, 1993). Taking into account the repeated nature of electricity markets, we check the robustness of the argument that the access to contract markets reduces the market power of generators. In particular, we investigate the sensitivity of this result with respect to the finite horizon assumption. This paper proposes a model of the electricity market where firms sign long-term supply contracts with their retailers. Subsequently, the firms repeatedly interact on the spot market. It is shown that contract markets help sustain collusion on the spot market.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aEkonomiska Forskningsinst. |cStockholmen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x552en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD43en_US
dc.subject.jelG13en_US
dc.subject.jelL13en_US
dc.subject.jelL94en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordContract marketen_US
dc.subject.keywordElectricityen_US
dc.subject.keywordSpot Marketen_US
dc.subject.keywordForwarden_US
dc.subject.keywordTacit collusionen_US
dc.subject.stwElektrizitätswirtschaften_US
dc.subject.stwMarkten_US
dc.subject.stwTermingeschäften_US
dc.subject.stwKartellen_US
dc.subject.stwVertragsrechten_US
dc.titleLong-term supply contracts and collusion in the electricity marketen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn379433389en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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