Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56051 
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dc.contributor.authorLohse, Timen
dc.contributor.authorRobledo, Julio R.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-16-
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-26T15:04:07Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-26T15:04:07Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56051-
dc.description.abstractMotivated by recent disasters, this paper analyzes the risk sharing aspect in a federation. The regions can be hit by a shock leading to losses that occur with an exogenous probability and in a stochastically independent way. The regions can spend effort on selfinsurance to reduce the size of the loss. Being part of a federation has two countervailing -elfare effects. On the one hand, there is the well known welfare increase due to risk pooling. On the other hand, the self-insurance effort is a public good, because all regions benefit from the reduction of the loss. There exists a Samaritan's dilemma kind of effect whereby regions reduce their self-insurance effort potentially leading to an overall welfare decrease. The central government can solve this dilemma by committing to fixed rather than variable transfers. This induces regions that behave non-cooperatively to still choose the efficient level of self-insurance effort.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWZB Discussion Paper |xSP II 2012-103en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelH72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordintergovernmental transfersen
dc.subject.keywordself-insuranceen
dc.subject.keyworddisaster policyen
dc.subject.stwFinanzausgleichen
dc.subject.stwGefangenendilemmaen
dc.subject.stwKatastrophenhilfeen
dc.subject.stwSchocken
dc.subject.stwSelbstversicherungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePublic self-insurance and the Samaritan's dilemma in a federation-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn688719341en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wzbfff:SPII2012103en

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