Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56037 
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dc.contributor.authorGraf, Juliaen
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-16-
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-20T16:57:04Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-20T16:57:04Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.isbn978-3-86304-044-4en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56037-
dc.description.abstractGroup Purchasing Organizations (GPOs) increasingly gain in importance with respect to the supply of pharmaceutical products and frequently use multiple or exclusive rebate contracts to exercise market power. Based on a Hotelling model of horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine the controversy whether there exists a superior rebate scheme as far as consumer surplus, firms profits and total welfare are concerned. Accounting for horizontal and vertical differentiation, we find that firms clearly prefer multiple over exclusive rebate contracts. Contrary, there exists no rebate form that per se lowers total costs for the members of the GPOs or maximizes total welfare.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHeinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) |cDüsseldorfen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDICE Discussion Paper |x45en
dc.subject.jelI11en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelL42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordGPOsen
dc.subject.keywordRebate Contractsen
dc.subject.keywordVertical Differentiationen
dc.titleThe effects of rebate contracts on the health care system-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn688727263en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:dicedp:45en

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