Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen:
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55854
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Mayer, Wolfgang | en |
dc.contributor.author | Mujumdar, Sudesh | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-06 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2012-03-08T16:47:45Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2012-03-08T16:47:45Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2012 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55854 | - |
dc.description.abstract | This paper introduces an alternative to the lobbying literature's standard assumption that money buys policies. Our model - in which influence-seeking requires both money to buy access and managerial time to utilize access - offers three significant benefits. First, it counters criticism that the money-buys-policies assumption is at odds with reality. Second, its much stronger lobbying incentives weaken the free-rider problem and raise incentives for lobby formation. Third, the model yields testable hypotheses on: the determinants of lobbying incentives; the number of lobbying firms in an industry; and the impact on industry lobbying by the size distribution of firms, contribution limits on firms, world price changes, and the ability to adjust labor employment. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKiel | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aEconomics Discussion Papers |x2012-15 | en |
dc.subject.jel | F16 | en |
dc.subject.jel | H0 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L1 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | lobbying | en |
dc.subject.keyword | free-rider problem | en |
dc.subject.keyword | size-distribution-of-firms | en |
dc.subject.keyword | world-price | en |
dc.subject.keyword | labor-market-flexibility | en |
dc.subject.stw | Interessenpolitik | en |
dc.subject.stw | Ökonomischer Anreiz | en |
dc.subject.stw | Interessenvertretung | en |
dc.subject.stw | Trittbrettfahrerverhalten | en |
dc.subject.stw | Betriebsgrößenstruktur | en |
dc.subject.stw | Außenhandelspreis | en |
dc.subject.stw | Arbeitsmarktflexibilität | en |
dc.subject.stw | Theorie | en |
dc.title | Lobbying: Buying and utilizing access | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 687954290 | en |
dc.rights.license | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.en | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201215 | en |
Datei(en):
Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.