Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55606 
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dc.contributor.authorRotemberg, Julio J.en
dc.date.accessioned2006-07-25-
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-23T08:23:41Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-23T08:23:41Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55606-
dc.description.abstractI suppose that people react with anger when others show themselves not to be minimally altruistic. With heterogeneous agents, this can account for the experimental results of ultimatum and dictator games. Moreover, it can account for the surprisingly large fraction of individuals who offer an even split, with parameter values that are more plausible than those required to explain outcomes in these experiments with the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Dickinson (2000), and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of Boston |cBoston, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x06-12en
dc.subject.jelD64en
dc.subject.jelD63en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelA13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleMinimally acceptable altruism and the ultimatum game-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn514906103en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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