Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55554
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dc.contributor.authorRotemberg, Julio J.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2006-03-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-23T07:59:37Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-23T07:59:37Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55554-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents a complete general equilibrium model with flexible wages, where the degree to which wages and productivity change when cyclical employment changes is roughly consistent with postwar U.S. data. Firms with market power are assumed to bargain simultaneously with many employees, each of whom finds himself matched with a firm only after a process of search. When employment increases as a result of reductions in market power, the marginal product of labor falls. This fall tempers the bargaining power of workers and thus dampens the increase in their real wages. The procyclical movement of wages is dampened further if the posting of vacancies is subject to increasing returns.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of Boston |cBoston, MAen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking paper series // Federal Reserve Bank of Boston |x06-5en_US
dc.subject.jelE24en_US
dc.subject.jelE37en_US
dc.subject.jelJ64en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.stwBetriebsgrößeen_US
dc.subject.stwMarktmachten_US
dc.subject.stwLohnverhandlungenen_US
dc.subject.stwLohnniveauen_US
dc.subject.stwArbeitsproduktivitäten_US
dc.subject.stwKonjunkturen_US
dc.subject.stwÖkonometrisches Modellen_US
dc.titleCyclical wages in a search-and-bargaining model with large firmsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn508635543en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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