Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55350 
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dc.contributor.authorFujiwara, Kenjien
dc.contributor.authorLong, Ngo Vanen
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-14-
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-15T17:38:12Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-15T17:38:12Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55350-
dc.description.abstractWe formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the feedback Nash equilibrium and two Stackelberg equilibria under two different leadership scenarios: leadership by the strategic importing country, and leadership by the exporting cartel. We numerically show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both players are better off if the importing country is the leader. The follower is worse off if the exporting cartel is the leader. Among the three game-theoretic outcomes, the world welfare is highest under the importing country's leadership and lowest under the exporting country's leadership.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3721en
dc.subject.jelC73en
dc.subject.jelL72en
dc.subject.jelQ34en
dc.subject.jelF18en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddynamic gameen
dc.subject.keywordexhaustible resourceen
dc.subject.keywordStackelberg leadershipen
dc.subject.keywordoptimal tariffen
dc.subject.stwErschöpfbare Ressourcenen
dc.subject.stwAußenhandelen
dc.subject.stwKartellen
dc.subject.stwZolltarifen
dc.subject.stwOptimale Besteuerungen
dc.subject.stwDynamisches Spielen
dc.subject.stwNash-Gleichgewichten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleOptimal tariffs on exhaustible resources: The case of a quantity setting cartel-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn685268225en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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