Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55319
Authors: 
Köthenbürger, Marko
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo working paper: Public Finance 3709
Abstract: 
The paper provides an equilibrium analysis of how countries compete for migrants. The type of competition (tax or transfer competition) depends on whether the competing countries have similar policy preferences. With symmetric preferences, countries compete in taxes for migrants. With asymmetric preferences, migration competition takes place in income support levels. The results are robust to the degree of mobility and to whether high-income or low-income households are mobile. The results are relevant, e.g., for federal policies that tackle inefficient migration competition and for evaluating whether a country may wish to adopt unilateral migration-purchase policies.
Subjects: 
migration
redistribution
income taxation
government strategy
endogenous type of competition
JEL: 
H70
J20
F20
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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