Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55256
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dc.contributor.authorGürtler, Marcen_US
dc.contributor.authorSieg, Gernoten_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-08en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-10T15:39:09Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-10T15:39:09Z-
dc.date.issued2006en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55256-
dc.description.abstractWe are considering for examination an Irreversible Investment under Uncertainty, subsidized by the government. If the government announces the termination of a form of subsidization, investors may decide to realize their investment in order to obtain the subsidy. These investors might have postponed an investment if future payment were assured. Depending on the degree of uncertainty and the time preference, the termination of said subsidy may cost the government more in toto than granting the subsidy on a continuing basis. We would like to show that a better strategy is to cut the subsidy in parts rather than terminate the subsidy in its entirety.en_US
dc.language.isogeren_US
dc.publisher|aInstitut für Finanzwirtschaft, Technische Universität Braunschweig |cBraunschweigen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking papers // Institut für Finanzwirtschaft, Technische Universität Braunschweig |xFW24V2en_US
dc.subject.jelH3en_US
dc.subject.jelD11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordIrreversibilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordInvestmentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordAnnouncement effecten_US
dc.subject.keywordsubsidiesen_US
dc.titleCrunch time: The optimal policy to avoid the "Announcement Effect" when terminating a subsidyen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn684919818en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:tbsifw:FW24V2-

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