Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55180
Authors: 
Drouvelis, Michalis
Saporiti, Alejandro
Vriend, Nicolaas J.
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper // School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London 682
Abstract: 
We study both theoretically and experimentally the complete set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional, majority rule election game with two candidates, who might be interested in power as well as in ideology, but not necessarily in the same way. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the paper uncovers the existence of two new equilibrium configurations, called 'one-sided' and 'probabilistic' policy differentiation, respectively. Our analysis shows how these equilibrium configurations depend on the relative interests in power (resp., ideology) and the uncertainty about voters' preferences. The theoretical predictions are supported by the data collected from a series of laboratory experiments, as we observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as the individual levels in all treatments, and the comparative statics effects across treatments are as predicted by the theory.
Subjects: 
electoral competition
power
ideology
uncertainty
Nash equilibrium
experimental evidence
JEL: 
C72
C90
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.