Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55174
Authors: 
Matros, Alexander
Zapechelnyuk, Andriy
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper // School of Economics and Finance, Queen Mary, University of London 670
Abstract: 
We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders' values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price.
Subjects: 
optimal mechanism
Vickrey auction
mediator
JEL: 
C73
D44
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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