Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55118
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorBarmettler, Franziskaen_US
dc.contributor.authorFehr, Ernsten_US
dc.contributor.authorZehnder, Christianen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-29en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-07T10:49:38Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-07T10:49:38Z-
dc.date.issued2011en_US
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:101:1-20110927533en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55118-
dc.description.abstractSocial preference research has received considerable attention in recent years. Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with social preferences has important implications in many economic domains. However, it is important to be aware of the fact that the empirical basis of this literature relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this lack of experimenter-subject anonymity may create selfish incentives to engage in seemingly other-regarding behavior. If this were the case these experiments would overestimate the importance of social preferences. Previous studies provide mixed results and methodological differences within and across studies make it difficult to isolate the impact of experimenter-subject anonymity on prosocial behavior. In this paper we use a novel procedure that allows us to examine the impact of the exact same ceteris-paribus variation in anonymity on behavior in three of the most commonly used games in the social preference literature. Our data does not support the hypothesis that introducing experimenter-subject anonymity affects observed prosocial behavior. We do not observe significant effects of experimenter-subject anonymity on prosocial behavior in any of our games.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion paper series // Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit |x5925en_US
dc.subject.jelC91en_US
dc.subject.jelD03en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordscrutinyen_US
dc.subject.keywordanonymityen_US
dc.subject.keywordlaboratory experimentsen_US
dc.subject.keywordprosocial behavioren_US
dc.subject.stwSoziale Wohlfahrtsfunktionen_US
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken_US
dc.subject.stwTesten_US
dc.titleBig experimenter is watching you!: Anonymity and prosocial behavior in the laboratoryen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn675448042en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

Files in This Item:
File
Size
287.43 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.