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dc.contributor.authorNell, Mathiasen
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-27-
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T15:36:41Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-03T15:36:41Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55013-
dc.description.abstractEven though high penalties for corruption offences have a deterrent and preventive effect, they also entrap bribe-takers and bribe-givers in their corrupt relationship. Moreover, pending penalties can be misused to make threats against opportunistic behavior and can thus stabilize risky bribe agreements. This paper shows how voluntary disclosure programs can be strategically applied to break the pact of silence and to promote opportunism in a targeted way. Against this background the paper studies the leniency provisions in the penal codes of 56 countries. The analysis reveals deficiencies in the utilization and in the design of voluntary disclosure programs for corruption offences.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aUniversität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät |cPassauen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPassauer Diskussionspapiere - Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe |xV-52-07en
dc.subject.jelK14en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordCriminal Lawen
dc.subject.keywordLeniencyen
dc.subject.keywordSelf-Reportingen
dc.subject.keywordVoluntary Disclosure Programen
dc.titleStrategic aspects of voluntary disclosure programs for corruption offences: Towards a design of good practice-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn68432976Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:upadvr:V5207en

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