Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55013
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dc.contributor.authorNell, Mathiasen_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-27en_US
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-03T15:36:41Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-03T15:36:41Z-
dc.date.issued2007en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55013-
dc.description.abstractEven though high penalties for corruption offences have a deterrent and preventive effect, they also entrap bribe-takers and bribe-givers in their corrupt relationship. Moreover, pending penalties can be misused to make threats against opportunistic behavior and can thus stabilize risky bribe agreements. This paper shows how voluntary disclosure programs can be strategically applied to break the pact of silence and to promote opportunism in a targeted way. Against this background the paper studies the leniency provisions in the penal codes of 56 countries. The analysis reveals deficiencies in the utilization and in the design of voluntary disclosure programs for corruption offences.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aUniv. Passau, Wirtschaftswiss. Fak. |cPassauen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPassauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe |xV-52-07en_US
dc.subject.jelK14en_US
dc.subject.jelL14en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen_US
dc.subject.keywordCriminal Lawen_US
dc.subject.keywordLeniencyen_US
dc.subject.keywordSelf-Reportingen_US
dc.subject.keywordVoluntary Disclosure Programen_US
dc.titleStrategic aspects of voluntary disclosure programs for corruption offences: Towards a design of good practiceen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn68432976Xen_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:upadvr:V5207-

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