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Graf Lambsdorff, Johann
Schubert, Manuel
Giamattei, Marcus
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-63-11
We carry out an experiment on a macroeconomic price setting game where prices are complements. Despite relevant information being common knowledge and price flexibility we observe significant deviation from equilibrium prices and history dependence. In a first treatment we observe that equilibrium values were obtained in the long run but at the cost of a very slow adjustment and thus history dependence. By reporting a business indicator in a simpler form, subjects were given the chance to coordinate their prices by help of a heuristic in a second treatment. This option was widely taken, bringing about excess volatility and a deviation from equilibrium even in the long run. In a third treatment with staggered pricing we observe, contrary to theoretical predictions, the one-round ahead (publicly known) shock is significant, but future inflation is not. Our findings cast light on price dynamics when subjects have limited computational capacities.
Inflation Persistence
Staggered Prices
Sticky Reasoning
New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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