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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 3673
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
A large fraction of domestically abused women report that their partners interfere with their participation in education and employment. As of yet, mainstream economics has not dealt in any systematic way with this phenomenon and its implications for welfare policy. This paper puts forward a theoretical framework that rationalizes why men may use violence instrumentally to prevent their partners from entering employment or from increasing hours of work. The model predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the gender wage gap and domestic violence. We explore the implication of this result in the context of various welfare policies. There are unlikely to be any magic bullets or one-size-fit-all solutions when it comes to reducing the incidence of domestic violence. Instead, specific measures and incentives may have to be targeted at different types of households.
Schlagwörter: 
instrumental partner-violence
non-cooperative family decision-making
welfare policy
JEL: 
J12
J22
D19
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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