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dc.contributor.authorBattaglini, Marcoen
dc.contributor.authorNunnari, Salvatoreen
dc.contributor.authorPalfrey, Thomasen
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-17-
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-23T10:59:27Z-
dc.date.available2012-01-23T10:59:27Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/54759-
dc.description.abstractWe present a legislative bargaining model of the provision of a durable public good over an infinite horizion. In each period, there is a societal endowment which can either be invested in the public good or consumed. We characterize the optimal public policy, defined by the time path of investment and consumption. In each period, a legislature with presentatives of each of n districts bargain over the current period's endowment for investment in the public good and transfers to each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes required for passage. We show that the efficiency of the public policy is increasing in q because higher q leads to higher investment in the public good and less pork. We examine the theoretical equilibrium predictions by conducting a laboratory experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and dictatorship (q=1).en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWZB Discussion Paper |xSP II 2011-205en
dc.subject.jelD71en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelC78en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.jelH54en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworddynamic political economyen
dc.subject.keywordvotingen
dc.subject.keywordpublic goodsen
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen
dc.subject.keywordexperimentsen
dc.titleLegislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn683228730en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:SPII2011205en

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