Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54580 
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dc.contributor.authorKonrad, Kai A.en
dc.contributor.authorThum, Marcelen
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-10-
dc.date.accessioned2012-01-11T11:40:27Z-
dc.date.availablestart=2012-01-11T11:40:27Z; end=2012-04-18-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/54580-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces the gains from global cooperation. This reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aWissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB) |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWZB Discussion Paper |xSP II 2011-109en
dc.subject.jelQ54en
dc.subject.jelQ58en
dc.subject.jelF53en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMitigationen
dc.subject.keywordinternational climate agreementsen
dc.subject.keywordbargainingen
dc.subject.keywordunilateral advancesen
dc.titleUnilateral action and negotiations about climate policy-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn682502189en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:wzbfff:SPII2011109en

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