Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/54450
Authors: 
Martín Pérez, Víctor
Martín Cruz, Natalia
Hernangómez Barahona, Juan
Year of Publication: 
2008
Citation: 
[Journal:] Investigaciones europeas de dirección de la empresa (IEDEE) [ISSN:] 1135-2523 [Volume:] 14 [Year:] 2008 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 51-72
Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the balance of organizational components in the design of an efficient organizational architecture from an agency perspective. The results of the empirical analysis, performed in the most prominent Spanish NGDO throughout the year 2003, show the great importance of the mutual influence among the delegation of decision rights, the incentive systems and the use of performance measurements in the achievement of organizational equilibrium.
Subjects: 
organizational architecture
incentives
delegation
performance
NGDOs
Document Type: 
Article

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