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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Papers on Risk and Insurance No. 16
Verlag: 
Hamburg University, Institute for Risk and Insurance, Hamburg
Zusammenfassung: 
When risks are interdependent, loss-prevention activities of one agent influence the risks faced by others. The social return to an investment in loss-prevention is greater than the private return. From a perspective of social welfare, the market allocation is not optimal and leads to under-investment in prevention allround. This article considers consumer welfare under conditions of interdependent risks and demonstrates that a monopolistic insurer can internalize the arising externalities by setting appropriate prevention incentives through insurance premiums. A monopoly insurance solution reduces not only costs of risk selection, but can also play an important role in loss-prevention.
Schlagwörter: 
externalities
insurance monopoly
Nash equilibrium
social welfare
JEL: 
C70
D62
G22
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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