Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53972
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dc.contributor.authorKryvtsov, Oleksiyen_US
dc.contributor.authorShukayev, Maliken_US
dc.contributor.authorUeberfeldt, Alexanderen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T12:58:58Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T12:58:58Z-
dc.date.issued2008en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53972-
dc.description.abstractThis paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting. We revisit this issue by introducing imperfect credibility, which is modeled as gradual adjustment of the private sector's beliefs about the policy change. We find that gains from switching to pricelevel targeting are small. A welfare loss occurs, if imperfect credibility is highly persistent.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aBank of Canada |cOttawaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBank of Canada Working Paper |x2008,37en_US
dc.subject.jelE31en_US
dc.subject.jelE52en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCredibilityen_US
dc.subject.keywordMonetary policy frameworken_US
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitisches Zielen_US
dc.subject.stwZentralbanken_US
dc.subject.stwInflation Targetingen_US
dc.subject.stwPreisniveauen_US
dc.subject.stwGlaubwürdigkeiten_US
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten_US
dc.subject.stwTheorieen_US
dc.titleAdopting price-level targeting under imperfect credibility: An updateen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn584976593en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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