Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53947 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2009-17
Verlag: 
Bank of Canada, Ottawa
Zusammenfassung: 
Using the Bank of Canada's main projection and policy-analysis model, ToTEM, this paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Following the policy change, private agents assign a probability to the event that the policy-maker will revert to inflation-targeting next period. As this probability decreases and imperfect credibility abates, inflation expectations in the economy become consistent with price-level targeting. The paper finds a large welfare gain when imperfect credibility is short-lived. The gain becomes smaller with persisting imperfect credibility, turning to a loss if it lasts more than 13 years.
Schlagwörter: 
Monetary policy framework
Monetary policy implementation
JEL: 
E31
E52
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
Erscheint in der Sammlung:

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
215.21 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.