Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53932
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorPaligorova, Teodoraen_US
dc.contributor.authorXu, Zhaoxiaen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T12:58:23Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T12:58:23Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53932-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the impact of pyramid ownership structure and multiple controlling shareholders on firm leverage. Pyramids, having at least one controlling shareholder and a subsidiary, rely significantly more on debt financing than non-pyramid firms. Moreover, higher leverage is observed in pyramids where the second controlling shareholders have more voting rights. We also find that the disparity between the voting rights of the first two controlling shareholders is negatively related to firm leverage. Interestingly, the influence of the second controlling shareholder is only present in non-family controlled pyramids. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that controlling shareholders in pyramids use debt to secure their private benefits.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aBank of Canada |cOttawaen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBank of Canada Working Paper |x2009,12en_US
dc.subject.jelG31en_US
dc.subject.jelG32en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordFinancial marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordInternational topicsen_US
dc.subject.stwUnternehmensfinanzierungen_US
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen_US
dc.subject.stwEigent├╝merstrukturen_US
dc.subject.stwFamilienunternehmenen_US
dc.subject.stwFremdkapitalen_US
dc.subject.stwG-7-Staatenen_US
dc.titleComplex ownership and capital structureen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn597607184en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

Files in This Item:
File
Size
260.09 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.