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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Bank of Canada Working Paper No. 2008-17
Verlag: 
Bank of Canada, Ottawa
Zusammenfassung: 
Given the increasing interdependence of both financial systems and attendant payment and settlement systems a vital question is what form should optimal policy take when there are two connected payment systems with separate regulators. In this paper I show that two central banks operating in a non-cooperative way will not have an incentive to achieve the optimal allocation of goods. I further show that this non-cooperative outcome will be supported by a zero intraday interest rate and constant fixed exchange rate. This is in contrast to recent research; which has shown that domestically a zero intraday interest rate will achieve a social optimum and that the central bank has an incentive to achieve it.
Schlagwörter: 
Payment, clearing, and settlement systems
Exchange rate regimes
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