Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53425
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorIlkiliç, Rahmien_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:34:55Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:34:55Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53425-
dc.description.abstractSuppose markets and firms are connected in a bi-partite network, where firms can only supply to the markets they are connected to. Firms compete a la Cournot and decide how much to supply to each market they have a link with. We assume that markets have linear demand functions and firms have convex quadratic cost functions. We show there exists a unique equilibrium in any given network of firms and markets. We provide a formula which expresses the quantities at an equilibrium as a function of a network centrality measure.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development |x32.2009en_US
dc.subject.jelC62en_US
dc.subject.jelC72en_US
dc.subject.jelD85en_US
dc.subject.jelL11en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordCournot Marketsen_US
dc.subject.keywordNetworksen_US
dc.subject.keywordNash Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.keywordCentrality Measuresen_US
dc.titleCournot competition on a network of markets and firmsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn645053813en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

Files in This Item:
File
Size
335.79 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.