Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 34.2011
Ultra-hazardous risky activities as the nuclear industry cannot be considered as normal industries i.e. without abnormal environmental and health risks. This theoretical paper studies the industrial organization of electro nuclear sectors from the view point of the general cost of impact prevention policy and civil liability. It assesses on a theoretical basis, how civil liability rules may induce or discourage the extension of nuclear parks to new emergent operators. It compares the consequences of extending to several independent owners the management of nuclear stations. This question can apply to the unification process of the European electricity market in which several public and private nuclear power operators are running. The paper shows that the choice between either a monopolistic scheme (one operator for several plants) or a decentralized one (one operator by station) depends on the condition of application of the legal civil liability regime and on the strength of the safety control exerted by the Nuclear Regulatory Authorities. It is shown that when the control is high, then the safety costs generated by the monopolistic organization are less than the same costs of a decentralized one. However, conditions on the insurance policy can mitigate this result.