Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/53405
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dc.contributor.authorValsecchi, Ireneen_US
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:34:36Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:34:36Z-
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53405-
dc.description.abstractThe paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size. Second, provided a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists, different message rules and beliefs can hold in other equilibria inducing the same action profile.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development |x19.2009en_US
dc.subject.jelD83en_US
dc.subject.ddc330en_US
dc.subject.keywordSender-Receiver Gamesen_US
dc.subject.keywordStrategic Information Transmissionen_US
dc.titleNon-uniqueness of equilibria in one-shot games of strategic communicationen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
dc.identifier.ppn644981350en_US
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen_US

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