Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53405 
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dc.contributor.authorValsecchi, Ireneen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:34:36Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:34:36Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53405-
dc.description.abstractThe paper shows that Perfect Bayesian equilibria need not be unique in the strategic communication game of Crawford and Sobel (1982). First, different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality, despite fixed prior beliefs. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size. Second, provided a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium exists, different message rules and beliefs can hold in other equilibria inducing the same action profile.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x19.2009en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSender-Receiver Gamesen
dc.subject.keywordStrategic Information Transmissionen
dc.titleNon-uniqueness of equilibria in one-shot games of strategic communication-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn644981350en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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