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dc.contributor.authorLang, John Templeen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:34:05Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:34:05Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53371-
dc.description.abstractThe Commission's Guidance paper on exclusionary abuse under Article 82 EC is open to three fundamental criticisms. First, it leads to less legal certainty, because the rules suggested are vague and imprecise, because dominant companies will not have the information needed to apply them, and because the Commission is trying to change the law, which it has no power to do. Second, it would lead to some anticompetitive effects, because in practice it discourages price competition, by discouraging individualised price negotiations and retroactive rebates, and by suggesting that the Commission will protect not-yet-as-efficient competitors from price competition. Third, it leads to too many false positives, i.e., findings of exclusionary abuse that are not justified in economics or law. The solution is to return to the test in the Treaty as interpreted by the Court of Justice: an exclusionary abuse must involve limiting the production, marketing or technical development of competitors of the dominant company, if harm is caused to consumers.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x65.2009en
dc.subject.jelK21en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordArticle 82ECen
dc.subject.keywordCompetitionen
dc.subject.keywordAbuseen
dc.titleArticle 82 EC - the problems and the solution-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn645192643en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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